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COMMENT
STATE LAW WRONGS, STATE LAW REMEDIES, AND
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Henry Paul Monaghan*
Parrattv. Taylor I is among the most puzzling Supreme Court decisions of the last decade, and the lower federal courts have been thrown
into considerable confusion in their efforts to implement it.2 In large
part, this confusion stems from the fact that Parratt decided two independent points: first, the negligent loss or destruction of property
by state officials could constitute a "deprivation" thereof for purposes
of the due process clause 3 of the fourteenth amendment; 4 and second,
the existence of an adequate state remedy to redress the wrong meant
that the deprivation was not "without due process of law." 5 In this
Comment, I hope to show that this second, or "state action," holding
contradicts long-embedded understandings of when a denial of due process occurs for fourteenth amendment purposes.
The state action issue remains important even after this term's decision in Daniels v. Williams. 6 Daniels expressly overruled Parratt'sfirst
holding. In Daniels, the Court held that, ordinarily, negligently inflicted
injuries to "liberty" and "property" are not the kind of "deprivations"
with which the due process clause is concerned. 7 But Daniels left undisturbed Parratt's state action theory. Indeed, the Daniels Court cited
with approval s Hudson v. Palmer,9 which had extended Parratt'sstate action holding to intentional deprivations of property by state officials. 1 0
Parratt'sstate action theory is best seen in a larger context. Parratt
* Thomas M. Macioce Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1955, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; LL.B. 1958, Yale University; LL.M. 1960, Harvard
University.
1. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
2. For a recent collection of the cases, see Moore, Parratt, Liberty, and the Devolution of Due Process: A Time for Reflection, 13 W. St. U.L. Rev. 201 (1985).
3. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of Life, Liberty, or Property, without
due process of law .... U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Parralt, 451 U.S. at 536-37.
5. Id. at 543-44.
6. 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986); see also
Whitley v. Albers, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986) (eighth amendment).
7. 106 S.Ct. at 664.
8. 106 S. Ct. at 665.
9. 468 U.S. 517 (1984). That Parratt's state action theory remains viable after
Daniels has already been recognized. See Holloway v. Walker, 790 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir.
1986); Mann v. City of Tucson, 782 F.2d 790, 799 (9th Cir. 1986) (Snead, J.,
concurring).
10. 468 U.S. at 530-34.
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is one part of an ongoing effort by the Supreme Court, particularly justice Rehnquist, to reorient fourteenth amendment jurisprudence. The
goal is to keep the lower federal courts out of the business of monitoring the routine day-to-day administration of state government in areas
that only marginally implicate constitutional values." Philosophically,
this development embodies a belief that a clear distinction can be
drawn between constitutional violations and state law wrongs. 12 Linguistically, it stresses a close parsing of section 198313 and the due process clause. Analytically, it generates two decisional lines: cases like
Board of Regents v. Roth 14 and Paulv. Davis 15 narrow the domain of constitutionally protected "liberty" and "property,"' 16 while decisions like
Daniels v. Williams and Parralt v. Taylor limit the state action that constitutes a "deprivation" or a "denial of due process" of interests admittedly entitled to constitutional protection.
The vagaries and gossamer distinctions of Roth and its progeny
have been examined by numerous commentators. 17 The important
point here is that in denying the presence of a "liberty" or "property"
interest, these decisions suggest that the state need not justify some
state-inflicted injuries to important interests of individuals.' 8 So far,
however, this line of authority is limited in reach and is largely confined
to the area of public entitlements. 19 Unlike Roth, Parratt deals with
"property" interests concededly entitled to constitutional protection.
As limited by Daniels, Parratt concerns one category of intentional interferences with such interests: 20 the conduct challenged under the fourteenth amendment is also misconduct under state law, and the state
11. See Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism," 43 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 39, 44-50 (1980).
12. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 427-28
(1977).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
14. 408 U.S. 564, 573, 578 (1972).
15. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Paul rejected a claim that the distribution of a police circular to local merchants containing defamatory material violated plaintiff's right to procedural due process because of the lack of a prior hearing. For criticism, see, e.g.,
* Monaghan, supra note 12. The Paul Court said that official defamation did not deprive
its victim of "liberty" or "property" because no fundamental constitutional right was
involved, and the defamation did not result in the imposition of a new legal disability on
the plaintiff. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701-02.
16. See Monaghan, supra note 12, at 423-29.
17. See, e.g., Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of
Roth and Perry, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 146 (1983).
18. Ordinarily, the state must make a twofold justification for injuries that it inflicts:
procedural-the harm may be imposed only in the context of certain procedural safeguards-and substantive-the harm must be based on an adequate reason. I recognize
that Roth and its progeny can be confined to procedural due process, although the logic
of the confinement escapes me. See Monaghan, supra note 12, at 421.
19. See Monaghan, supra note 11, at 41-43.
20. Parratt,451 U.S. at 536.
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provides an adequate remedy for the wrong. The crucial question is
the constitutional relevance of either of these facts.
In the past, these facts have been irrelevant. The landmark decision in Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles 2 1 established
that any intentional conduct of state officials that, prima facie, contravened the fourteenth amendment is open to challenge in the district
courts without regard to whether that conduct also violates state law or
whether the state provides adequate corrective process. 22 Monroe v.
Pape2 3 confirmed Home Telephone, and as a matter of statutory construction, also held "that section 1983 presently occupies and exploits all of
the constitutional space that Home Telephone permits."' 24 In Monroe, the
Court held that section 1983's "under color of [state law]" requirement
embraces conduct by state officials that violated state law, 25 and that
the section 1983 remedy is "supplementary" to any state judicial
26
remedy.
27
Despite the apparent sweep of Home Telephone and Monroe,
Parratt'sstate action holding is designed to exclude one form of intentional misuse of state authority from the federal trial courts: misconduct that, unlike the conduct in Home Telephone, is "random and
unauthorized," and that, unlike the conduct in Monroe, does not infringe upon a "fundamental" constitutional right. As yet, this exclusion applies only if the state provides adequate corrective process.
Parratt's limited compass does not diminish its practical importance. With the exception of police brutality cases, Parratt excludes
from the federal courts all low-level intentional official misconduct resulting in losses of property or nonfundamental liberties where state
law provides a remedy. Hudson v. Palmer2 8 is the paradigmatic illustration. In Hudson, a prison officer, acting without authority, intentionally
21. 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
22. Id. at 288.
23. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
24. Zagrans, "Under Color Of" What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section
1983 Liability, 71 Va. L. Rev. 499, 514 (1985).
25. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171-85.
26. Id. at 183; see also Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1949 (1985) (Congress
intended a § 1983 claim to be "independently enforceable whether or not it duplicates a
parallel state remedy." (citing Monroe)). Monroe's under color of law holding is sharply
criticized in Zagrans, supra note 24. However, Professor Zagrans agrees with the Court
that when § 1983 is triggered, the existence of a state remedy is irrelevant. Id.
27. In addition, Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), confirmed that a
plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action. Id.
at 516. Finally, Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909), sustained the district
court's pendent jurisdiction over any state-created rights to relief, id. at 191, although
relief on this score is qualified by the eleventh amendment. See Pennhurst State School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984); see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v.
Dayton Christian Schools, 106 S.Ct. 2718 (recent case imposing important limits on
Patsy).
28. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
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destroyed an inmate's property during a shakedown search.2 9 After denying that any fundamental right was implicated, the Court characterized the officer's conduct as "random and unauthorized. ' 30 Parrattwas
then invoked to bar the inmate's section 1983 due process claim because the inmate had an adequate remedy in the state courts.3 1
This Comment contends that Parrattis ultimately grounded in a
theory of "state action" that cannot be reconciled with the more general constitutional understandings contained in Home Telephone and
Monroe. Moreover, Parratthas consequences that arguably are beyond
the power of Congress to alter. These results are unfortunate and unnecessary. Either the remaining aspects of Parrattshould be overruled,
or the decision should be recast. The Court's goals-which are certainly defensible-can be achieved by viewing Parrattas abstention doctrine, or alternatively, by statutory construction: by limiting the scope
of section 1983 so that its requirement of "under color of [state law]"
does not include random and unauthorized wrongs for which the state
provides adequate corrective process.
I. PARRATT v. TAYLOR

While Parratt arose in a prison setting, it presented a common
problem: low-level misconduct in the routine administration of state
government that results in the loss or destruction of the plaintiff's
property. The conduct violates state law, and the state law provides a
remedy for the wrong. But the plaintiff also insists that this conduct
also violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and
he brings a section 1983 action in federal court.3 2 More specifically, in
Parratt the plaintiff alleged that he had ordered by mail a hobby kit
worth $23.50. Upon its receipt at the prison, the kit was not processed
according to established mail procedure and was negligently lost by
prison officials. As a result, the plaintiff claimed a "deprivation" of his
property "without due process of law."'33 The district court gave sum34
mary judgment for the plaintiff; the court of appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist.3 5
The Court began by setting out the language of section 1983:
29. Id. at 520.
30. Id. at 532.
31. Id. at 534-35.
32. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 530 (1981). Efforts to cast these official misconduct cases as equal protection violations are foreclosed by Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
1, 7-13 (1944).

33. 451 U.S. at 529.
34. Id. at 529-30.
35. Id. at 529. Justice Rehnquist's opinion was for the Court on all the points in the
case. In view of the reservations expressed in several concurring opinions, some commentators have asserted that it represented only a plurality on the topic of this paper.
See, e.g., Note, Due Process and Section 1983: Limiting Parralt v. Taylor to Negligent
Conduct, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 253, 255-58 (1983).
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usuage of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action3 at
law,
6
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
After concluding that the defendant's conduct satisfied section 1983's
"under color of [state law]" requirement,3 7 the Court decided two very
different points.
First, the Court held that defendants' negligence could work a
"deprivation" of "property" within the meaning of section 1983 and
the fourteenth amendment.3 8 On this point, Daniels v. Williams3 9 explicitly overrules Parratt. Daniels held that while section 1983 has no
state of mind requirement, at least some parts of the fourteenth amendment do. The Court insisted that negligent injuries are far removed
from the evils of arbitrary governmental oppression that are the concern of the due process clause. 40 Strong federalism principles, reflecting a belief in a distinction between ordinary state law wrongs and
constitutional violations, drove the holding:
Our Constitution deals with the large concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant
traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate
liability for injuries that attend living together in society. We
have previously rejected reasoning that "would make of the
Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed
upon whatever systems may already be administered by the
States .... "41
Second, the ParrattCourt held that the "deprivation" did not infringe upon any "rights . . .secured by the Constitution" within the
meaning of section 1983,42 because the deprivation was not without
due process of law.43 Daniels' approving citation of Hudson v. Palmer

seemingly confirms that Parratt'sstate action holding remains good law
for some forms of intentional official misconduct. 44 Thus, Parratt'sreasoning requires careful attention.
36. Parratt,451 U.S. at 532 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)) (emphasis added).

37. Id. at 535.
38. Id. at 537.
39. 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986).
40. Id. at 665.
41. Id. at 666 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)); see also Walker v.
Rowe, 791 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1986) (a careful opinion by Judge Easterbrook on the
relationship between due process and due care).
42. 451 U.S. at 535.
43. Id. at 543.
44. 106 S.Ct. at 665.
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FALSE STARTS: PROCEDURAL AND JURISDICTIONAL

ACCOUNTS

OF PARRATT

Several quite different accounts of Parratt can be given, each of
which has significantly different implications for the principles of federal jurisdiction and, more importantly, for substantive constitutional
law. In order to understand Parratt,it seems helpful to discuss first
what the case is not about.
A. Parratt as ProceduralDue Process
In Parratt, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had received all
the process that was due.45 Postdeprivation process was constitutionally sufficient where, as here: (1) the plaintiff did not challenge the established procedures for processing mail; (2) the defendants' conduct
was "random and unauthorized," and thus predeprivation process was
impracticable; and (3) state law provided adequate postdeprivation corrective process. 4 6 Focusing on this aspect of Parralt,several federal appellate courts have understood the case to be simply a procedural due
process decision, concerned only with the timing of any constitutionally
required process. Recently, the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
have taken this position, and after Daniels other courts might be encouraged to so view the case. 47 In a categorical manner these courts
insist that Parratthas no applicability to any substantive due process
challenge, and that such challenges can be brought immediately in the
federal courts. This is an attractive position. A procedural due process
interpretation accords with the great bulk of the Parrattopinion, which
is quite plainly concerned with the constitutional sufficiency of postdeprivation process, and with the views expressed in several concurring
48
opinions.
But this limited conception of Parrattwill not work. This becomes
45. 451 U.S. at 543-44.
46. See id. at 541, 543-44. While the Court's procedural due process holding is

plainly correct as applied to negligence, it is less obviously so as applied to the intentional misconduct in Hudson v. Palmer. See, e.g., Note, Unauthorized Conduct of State
Officials Under the Fourteenth Amendment: Hudson v. Palmer and the Resurrection of

Dead Doctrines, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 837, 863-65 (1985).
47. See Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986); McClary

v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 86 n.3 (2d Cir. 1986); Williams v. City of St. Louis, 783 F.2d
114, 118 (8th Cir. 1985); De Pew v. City of St. Mary's, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499-1500 (11 th
Cir. 1986); Nahmod, Due Process, State Remedies, and Section 1983, 34 Kansas L. Rev.
217, 233 (1985) (arguing that Parrat should not apply to incorporated Bill of Rights

provisions or substantive due process claims). At times, the line between procedural
and substantive claims becomes blurred. See Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287,
1293-94 (5th Cir. 1986).
48. Moreover, it can explain Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), which unanimously extended Parratto the random and unauthorized but intentional deprivations of
an inmate's property. It can also explain Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422
(1982), a case, which arose in the state courts, in which the Supreme Court sustained a
procedural due process challenge to a state forfeiture rule.
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apparent once the concept of "substantive due process" is unpacked.
Insofar as the concept refers to fundamental rights, such as those contained in the Bill of Rights or those accorded fundamental status under
the Roe v. Wade4 9 line of cases, Parratthas no relevance. 50 But insofar
as substantive due process refers simply to the general substantive freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable restraints on "liberty" and
"property," Parrattis relevant.
My conclusion rests on two grounds. First, if Parratthas no substantive import, why was the judgment for plaintiff reversed? One
would have expected that, having rejected the procedural due process
claim, the Court would then address the plaintiff's substantive constitutional claim. And here the result appeared clear: the facts were not in
dispute; the Court had already decided that the defendants' conduct
had worked a "deprivation" of the plaintiff's property; 5 1 and no immunity rule shielded the defendants from damages. 52 Accordingly, unless
the plaintiff had asserted only a procedural due process claim-a point
nowhere suggested in the Court's opinion 53 -the judgment below
should have been affirmed, not reversed.
Second, a procedural due process interpretation cannot plausibly
account for Parratt'sfinal paragraphs. The Court does not say that the
judgment for damages was reversed because the plaintiff had alleged
only an unsound procedural due process claim. 54 Rather, reversal
seems premised on the belief that the plaintiff was in the wrong forum.
In concluding that the plaintiff "has not alleged a violation of the Due
Process Clause," 55 the Court abandons its prior discussion of due pro49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. The one arguable exception to Parratt'sinapplicability to "fundamental" right
claims is the takings clause insofar as it secures protection against "regulatory" takings.

See infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
51. The ParrattCourt did not address the substantive character of the plaintiff's
claim. But it recognized that plaintiff possessed a "property" interest originating in
state law, 451 U.S. at 529 n.1, an interest that it assumed was entitled to some substan-

tive fourteenth amendment protection. One would expect consideration of whether defendants' negligence constituted a "taking"--that term sometimes appears in the

opinion-or simply a loss of property that, while technically not amounting to a taking,
nonetheless constituted such a "deprivation" that substantive due process required ap-

propriate redress. See infi-a notes 76-77 and accompanying text. As we shall see, the
Court's analysis makes this the wrong inquiry.
52. Malley v. Briggs, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (1986); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806
(1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
53. Nahmod, supra note 47, at 225-26. Even if one assumes that the Supreme
Court considered the plaintiffs in Parrattand Hudson to be raising only procedural due
process claims, the Court's reasoning in those two cases still must be understood as
adopting a state action doctrine contrary to Home Telephone. See Note, supra note 46, at

845-61.
54. Nor can the Court be understood as saying that plaintiff was making a substan-

tive constitutional claim wholly out of the defendants' violations of state law. See
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
55. Parratt,451 U.S. at 543.
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cess in a plainly procedural sense. Instead, the traditional distinction
between substantive and procedural due process is collapsed,5 6 and
due process is discussed as though it were a unitary concept:
Although he has been deprived of property under color of
state law, .. . there is no contention that the [established state]
procedures themselves are inadequate nor is there any contention that it was practicable for the State to provide a
predeprivation hearing . .

..

This [state] procedure was in

existence at the time of the loss here in question but respondent did not use it ....[Even though not identical to § 1983,
the state] remedies provided could have fully compensated the
respondent for the property loss he suffered, and we hold that
they are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Our decision today is fully consistent with our prior cases.
To accept respondent's argument that the conduct of the state
officials in this case constituted a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment... "would make of the Fourteenth Amendment
a font of tort law ...."57
During Parratt'sheyday-when negligence could constitute a "deprivation" of property-these paragraphs were widely understood to require
that a plaintiff vindicate any substantive damage claim in the state
58
courts.

56. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985), reaffirms that
distinction in very strong terms. Significantly, Justice Rehnquist dissented. See id. at
1502 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57. Parratt,451 U.S. at 543-44.
58. See Moore, supra note 2, at 203 n.18 (collecting cases). In her dissent from the
denial of certiorari in Gregory v. Pittsfield, 105 S. Ct. 1380, 1382-83 (1985), Justice
O'Connor focused upon the procedural due process aspects of Parrall, but earlier she
had also recognized its substantive import. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 537
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The substantive understanding of Parrattunderpins
the Court's frequent efforts to show that the state remedy is constitutionally adequate,
even though not quite so generous as § 1983. At least indirectly, Daniels reinforces Parraft's forum-allocating significance. The petition raised only a substantive due process
claim; the Court acknowledged that due process not only secures procedural fairness, it
"bar[s] certain government actions regardless of the procedures used to implement
them." Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 665 (1986). This statement came after the
Court had lumped together several procedural and substantive due process cases. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Daniels underscores this point, though inadvertently.
He asserts that Parraitapplies only to procedural due process claims, id. at 678, and that
the existence vel non of a state remedy is a matter of procedural due process. Id. at 679.
This latter categorization seems wrong but understandable. Two concepts, substance
and procedure, are asked to order three bodies of law: substantive law, remedial law,
and procedural rules. In this framework, both the nature of the substantive duties imposed on state officials by the fourteenth amendment and the extent to which the state
must provide remedies for their violation are matters of substantive due process. Compare P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & M. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 17-25 (2d ed. 1973) (failure of state law to provide a
remedy or an inadequate state ground) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler] with id. at 26
(inadequate "procedural" state ground).
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B. Parratt as Abstention Doctrine
As modified by Daniels, Parrattmight be viewed as a special abstention doctrine applicable to certain cases in which plaintiffs seek damages for "deprivations" of constitutionally protected "property" or
"liberty" resulting from intentional official conduct that also violates
state law and for which the state provides corrective process. Official
misconduct can come in different forms. For example, in Home Telephone, the officials were enforcing a municipal rate ordinance, but if the
ordinance constituted a deprivation of property without due process of
law, it also would have conflicted with the state constitution. 5 9 Monroe
v. Pape involved a constitutionally offensive search and seizure 60 that
was unauthorized by any level of state law. The conduct in Parrattwas
not authorized by state law, and it did not impinge upon any specific
"fundamental" right. 6 1 Excluding cases like Parrattfrom the federal
trial courts is certainly a defensible policy. Those courts seem ill-used
if their task is to superintend the routine administration of state government where the states are themselves willing to correct abuses and
62
no fundamental rights are involved.
Treating Parrattas a special abstention doctrine for this narrow category of federal claims would be a bold move. The Court has often
spoken of the district courts' "virtually unflagging obligation" 6 3 to exercise their statutory jurisdiction. Surely, the propriety of such a massive, judicially fashioned curtailment of statutorily mandated
jurisdiction is open to doubt.64 Yet, employed here and in other areas
of "routine" state administration, 6 5 abstention doctrine has the considerable advantage of recognizing that the point in time at which a substantive constitutional violation takes place is not necessarily
determinative of the point in time at which entry to the federal courthouse is obtained. On the latter point, the existence vel non of state
66
corrective process is a relevant consideration.
59. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 282 (1913).
60. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).

61. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700 (1976), an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, distinguishes Monroe on that ground. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
62. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976); Monaghan, supra note 11,
at 44-46.
63. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15
(1983) (citation omitted).

64. Compare Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 Yale LJ. 71 (1984) (arguing against use of abstention doctrine) with
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985) (discretion to hear

cases within federal courts' jurisdiction is necessary to permit courts to protect
themselves).
65. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976); Monaghan, supra note 11,
at 43-49.
66. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 58, at 946. In Mann v. City of Tucson, 782
F.2d 790, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1986) (Snead, J., concurring),Judge Snead's thoughtful concurring opinion notes the relationship between Parratt and abstention doctrine. Viewing
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But Parratt'sreasoning is not captured by abstention doctrine. For
the Court, something quite different underlies the decision.
C. Parratt as Ripeness or Exhaustion of Remedies
The Court has also suggested that Parrattrests on principles akin
to ripeness, 67 a doctrine that concerns the timing of access to the federal courts. Ripeness principles require that controversies be sufficiently focused to ensure a clear presentation of the issues. 68
In Williamson County Regional PlanningCommission v. Hamilton Bank, 69
a landowner filed a regulatory taking challenge in the district court. 70
The Court gave two reasons for its conclusion that the challenge was
"premature." First, the Court found that further administrative relief
to the landowner was possible by way of variance. 7 1 Second, the Court
held: "The taking claim is not yet ripe [because the landowner] did not
seek compensation through the ijudicial] procedures the State has provided for doing so." 72 This second ground is of concern to us, for here
the Court shuts the federal courthouse door even if all state administrative remedies have been exhausted.
From the settled premise that the takings clause itself does not require pre-taking process or pre-taking compensation, the Court somehow generated another conclusion: any substantive takings claim is
"premature" until the landowner "has used the [state provided judicial] procedure and been denied just compensation. ' 73 The Court believed that this result was "analogous to the Court's holding in Parratt,"
and added:
In... a situation [such as Parratt], the Constitution does not
require predeprivation process because it would be impossible
or impracticable to provide a meaningful hearing before the
deprivation. Instead, the Constitution is satisfied by the proviParrallin abstention terms would expose its links to other explicit forum-allocating doctrines, such as that in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), which emphasized standing and equitable constraints on granting prospective relief against official
policies.
67. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S.
Ct. 3108 (1985).
68. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Elec. Resources Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
69. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
70. Id. at 3110.
71. Id. at 3120. This conclusion rested upon an unclear distinction between what
ripeness principles required and the settled rule that in § 1983 actions exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not required. Id. at 3121. The Court's conclusion seems
sensible, however, at least in the special context of challenges to land use controls. The
precise nature of what the developer is permitted has an important bearing on whether
there has been a regulatory taking. See MacDonald v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561,
2566-67 (1986).
72. 105 S. Ct. at 3121.
73. Id.
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sion of meaningful postdeprivation process. .

.

. Thus, the

State's action is not "complete" in the sense of causing a constitutional injury "unless or until the State fails to provide an
adequate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss."
Likewise... the State's action here is not "complete" until the
74
State fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking.
This passage indiscriminately mixes jurisdictional, procedural due
process, and substantive taking concepts. The Court is quite wrong in
thinking that the point in time at which a substantive deprivation occurs
is a function of the point in time at which the state can reasonably provide corrective process. The relationship runs the other way: discussion about the timing of any process due presupposes independent
criteria for specifying the point at which the substantive deprivation has
occurred. 75 Moreover, the Court's reliance on ripeness concepts is in
error. No authority supports use of ripeness doctrine to bar federal
judicial consideration of an otherwise sufficiently focused controversy
simply because corrective state judicial process had not been invoked.
Hamilton Bank might be defended, as a footnote in the opinion suggests, as a special rule for takings cases-a rule grounded in the perception that it is not the taking but the refusal to compensate that
constitutes the violation. 7 6 The difficulty here is that the argument cannot be so limited. Assuming that some intentional property deprivations are not to be viewed as takings, these "non-taking" property
"deprivations" cannot be accorded readier access to the district courts
for substantive relief than are takings claims. Thus, it would seem that
all substantive property claims, whether takings or not, must be pursued in the state courts, so long as an adequate corrective process exists. While this analysis yields a distinction between claims of liberty
and of property, 7 7 the distinction is not consistent with Hamilton Bank's
general ripeness, which posits that the constitutionally relevant state
action is not "complete" until the state court acts. That view of ripe74. Id. at 3121-22 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.12 (1984) (cita-

tion omitted)).
75. If a police officer, acting in a random and unauthorized manner, hauls a speaker
from a platform or breaks into a home without a warrant, the impracticability of
predeprivation process does not mean that no substantive deprivation has occurred.
76. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct.
3108, 3122 n.14 (1985). There is no constitutional imperative that the amount of compensation initially be determined by a judicial tribunal. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods., 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3334 (1985). Home Telephone and other utility
confiscation cases could be analyzed as instances where it was conceded that no compensation was intended if the rates were adjudged to be confiscatory.
77. See Moore, supra note 2, at 221-58 (collecting cases and advocating this position). Apparently, this distinction reflects Justice Blackmun's understanding at one
time. See Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will
the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1985). But see Davidson
v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668, 676 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (assuming that Parratt
and Hudson apply to deprivations of liberty interests).
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ness seems equally applicable to deprivations of "liberty" and of
"property." In any event, Hamilton Bank's ripeness rhetoric fails to capture Parratt'sbasic premise. Ripeness is concerned only with the timing
of access to the district courts; but Parrattcompletely bars access, if the
78
state corrective process is adjudged "adequate.
III.

EXPLAINING PARRA

r

Parrattis concerned with interests that owe their existence to state
law but that constitute "property" for due process purposes. Parratt
seeks to distinguish sharply between injuries to this category of constitutionally protected interests and injuries to "fundamental" constitutional rights. While hard to capture in a phrase, this distinction seems
best expressed in "state action" terms. The heart of the distinction is
the moment in time at which the constitutionally decisive state action is
thought to occur.
With respect to fundamental rights, the Court continues to assert,
as it did in Monroe v. Pape,79 that section 1983 "makes a deprivation...
actionable independently of state law." 80° The injured plaintiff has immediate access to federal courts whether or not the complained of conduct contravenes state law and whether or not the state provides
corrective process. Thus, in fundamental rights cases, the constitutionally offensive state action occurs when the state official acts or threatens
to act.
But where only a "property" interest is involved, as in Parratt,the
analysis is more complex. If the deprivation is pursuant to some official
policy, then the Monroe v. Pape approach is followed. However, if the
official conduct is "random and unauthorized," the crucial constitution78. Hamilton Bank is not implicated if the state courts cannot give damages. See
Furey v. City of Sacramento, 780 F.2d 1448, 1450 n.l (9th Cir. 1986). Hamilton Bank will
create enormous problems, however, where the state courts can grant damages. Suppose that, after Hamilton Bank, plaintiff brings suit in the state court and loses on the
merits or on amount of 'just compensation." Can he now resort to the federal district
court on the theory that his § 1983 rights did not arise until the entry of an "inadequate" state courtjudgment? The plaintiff will assert that in the state court he had only
a state law claim for damages, and that was all that was decided. In the federal court, the
plaintiff will insist that the constitutional violation was not "complete" until the state
court acted, at which point the dissatisfied litigant could bring a proceeding in the federal court. If so, the whole matter is relitigated in the federal court with the state law
serving only to provide the precise dimensions of plaintiffs state law rights. A major
difficulty for the plaintiff is, of course, that any such litigation will be met by issue and
claim preclusion defenses. See University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 106 S. Ct. 3220 (1986). On
the general problems generated by Hamilton Bank, see Symposium, 29 Wash. UJ. Urb. &
Contemp. L. 3 (1986).
79. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
80. Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1943-44 (1985); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
710-11 n.5 (1976). The federal appellate courts have recognized that Parrattdoes not
apply to fundamental right cases. See, e.g., Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions and
Section 1983, 60 Ind. L.J. 559, 562 n.10 (1985) (collecting cases).
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ally offensive state action may shift. This is because the focus is not on

the specific official act, but on the overall design of the legislative
scheme.8 ' If adequate corrective process exists, the conduct of the
state official is not of constitutional dimension; it is only a state law
wrong. If adequate corrective process does not exist, anyone injured as
a result of that omission has suffered a constitutional deprivation. The
specific act that causes the loss is not of constitutional significance ex82
cept to create standing to complain.
On this analysis, Parratt'spremises seem as applicable to "liberty"
as to "property." If that is true, Parrattwill require that intentional but
random and unauthorized state misconduct be sorted into two categories: injuries to fundamental rights and "straight" substantive due process claims, which involve challenges to state conduct that "arbitrarily"
or "unreasonably" interferes with liberty or property. The need to
classify certain actions, such as police brutality, will present some
boundary uncertainty.8 3 At first glance, the category of "fundamental"
rights seems coterminous with those provisions of the Bill of Rights
held applicable to the states, as well as any judicially-created fundamental rights.8 4 But this line may not quite capture the distinctions made in
81. Parratl considered, and this Comment discusses, the issue in the context of legislatively prescribed remedies. But the discussion is equally applicable to a legislative
scheme coupled with common law remedies. It may be that in the Parrattscheme the
crucial time is the time of suit: if adequate remedies do not exist at the time of the act,
but do at the time of the suit, there may be no violation. In any case, for us the crucial
point is not when the actual injury is sustained.
82. This interpretation departs from settled understanding, because concrete injury has always been the essence of the violation, not simply a pre-condition to suit. See
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363,
1389-92 (1973).
83. Does excessive use of force by police officers constitute a fundamental right
case, under Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), as judge Friendly believed?
See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973). Or has Rochin been effectively rejected, with police brutality now treated as a
fourth amendment case on the theory of Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985), as
Judge Easterbrook thinks? See Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1404-09 (7th Cir.
1985) (concurring opinion). Or is police brutality simply an interference with the citizen's general "liberty" and thus governed by Parratt? See id. at 1399-1400 n.3 (citing
cases). Rochin was cited with apparent approval in Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 665, and Whitley
v. Albers, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1088 (1986), and discussed with apparent approval in Moran
v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1147 (1986). Johnson was cited with approval in Davidson v.
Cannon, 106 S.Ct. 668, 670-71 (1986).
There are other illustrations of boundary uncertainty. For example, to what extent
does an inmate confined by state authority possess a fundamental right to safe custody,
or only a general "liberty" interest to such protection? That issue remains only partially
clarified by Daniels and its companion case, Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
See Whitley, 106 S. Ct. at 1088 (overlap of due process and eighth amendment protections in prison context). For a discussion of this issue see Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507,
511 (7th Cir. 1986).
84. This is the sex-marriage-privacy category symbolized by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), and its progeny.
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the cases, particularly in the opinions ofJustice Rehnquist. Seemingly,
he distinguishes between rights, such as first and fourth amendment
rights, whose sole origin is in the Constitution, and rights with origins
in state law and which are simply protected by the Constitution.8 5 This
distinction subjects at least some takings claims to the Parrattregime,
even though protection against uncompensated takings is a specific textual guarantee. On the other hand, for Justice Rehnquist the federal
content of "liberty" includes a root freedom from the imposition of
new legal disabilities, even though that "liberty" cannot be fitted into a
86
Bill of Rights mold.

The complex distinctions spawned by Parratt reflect the Court's
deep-seated belief that a sufficiently stable line exists between constitutional torts and simple state law wrongs.8 7 But in fact, many statecaused constitutional violations necessarily retain much of the substance of common law torts.8 8 In any area where a "specific" constitu85. See Monaghan, supra note 12, at 424-29; Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
143-46 (1979), in whichJustice Rehnquist emphasized the same theme in the context of
a suit by a person mistakenly arrested and held for three days under a facially valid
warrant. There was no violation of substantive due process; at best, plaintiff possessed a
tort claim for false imprisonment. See also Toney El v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1224, 1227
(7th Cir. 1985) (no liberty or property right involved in delayed release from prison).
86. See Monaghan, supra note 12, at 424-25.
87. In Paul, the Court seemingly assumed that some injuries that would be tortious
if unjustified could not constitute constitutional violations. Paul, 424 U.S. at 698-99.
See Monaghan, supra note 12, at 427-28.
In Daniels, the Court said that it is "no reflection on either the breadth of the United
States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to say that they do not
address the same concerns." Daniels, 106 S.Ct. at 666. During much of our constitutional history, the only apparent difference between a public officer and a common law
tortfeasor was that the officers asserted a defense of official authorization. Once the
Constitution operated to negate that defense, the public official was simply a tortfeasor
and as such could be sued in federal court. The restrictive view that this was the only
occasion on which federal intervention was constitutionally appropriate was eroded in
cases like Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908), where the alleged state wrong
lacked a clear common law analogue. The view was abandoned completely when judicial
review of administrative action became commonplace. See Monaghan, supra note 82, at
1386-90.
88. See Monaghan, supra note 12, at 427-28; see also Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S.Ct.
1938, 1945 (1985) (claims under § 1983 are best characterized as personal injury actions
for limitations purposes). As the Second Circuit recently noted, "[I]n this case a finding
of liability for either false arrest or malicious prosecution would also require a finding of
liability under section 1983." Raysor v. Port Authority, 768 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1227 (1986); cf. Lewis v. Downs, 774 F.2d 711, 713-14 (6th Cir.
1985) (conduct constituting tort also violates § 1983 if it "shocks the conscience of the
court"). I recognize that injuries inflicted by public officers can be thought to differ
significantly from injuries inflicted by private persons. Backed by state power and apparent authority, such officials threaten core societal notions of human dignity through
their misconduct. See Wells & Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 201, 221-32 (1984). Moreover, the interests protected by
the common law may not be congruent with those protected by constitutional analogues, particularly given the current expansive readings of most constitutional provi-
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tional provision has a common law tort counterpart, any effort at
positing a strong distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional torts is not likely to succeed. In these situations, a section 1983
litigant will allege the substance of a common law tort and perhaps
some additional aggravating circumstances. 8 9
The Court's recent efforts to fashion a general theory of state
wrongs under the fourteenth amendment is incomplete. Indeed, as
Daniels shows, this project is open to continuous revision. But at present, we have a rather complicated three-tiered structure:
1. Fundamentalrights. This category includes most of the Bill of Rights
plus judicially posited fundamental rights. 90 The focus here is on the
specific act of official misconduct, which gives rise to an immediate
right under section 1983 to sue in the federal court for damages and
injunctive relief. This section 1983 claim stands whether the defendant's conduct is authorized or unauthorized under state law or
whether the state provides adequate corrective process. Monroe v.
Pape91 is the classic illustration.
2. Liberty or property invasions. The focus here is on intentional (and
perhaps reckless) interference with interests that originate in state law
but that amount to "liberty" or "property" within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment. So long as the challenge is not to an official
state policy, but only to random and unauthorized misconduct, the
state wrong is not in the interference but only in the denial of the corrective process. Parrattv. Taylor 92 provides the theoretical underpinning for this model, although Hudson v. Palmer9 3 is the best illustration.
3. Other injuries. The focus here is on a set of state harms to specific
individuals that do not implicate either "liberty" or "property." In
principle, such harms do not seem to require any justification under the
due process clause. So far this is a quite limited area, largely involving
public sector entitlements such as welfare and jobs. Moreover, the
Court has spoken only of the lack of need for predeprivation process,
and it has hinted that the availability of some state law remedies is important. Board of Regents v. Roth 9 4 is the standard bearer here.
sions. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 394 (1971) ("The interests protected by state laws regulating trespass and invasion
of privacy, and those protected by the Fourth Amendment's guarantee... may be inconsistent or even hostile.").
89. See Cameron v. IRS, 773 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1985); Gumz v. Morrissette,
772 F.2d 1395, 1399-1440 (7th Cir. 1985). I agree with Judge Posner in Cameron that
some technically tortious activity might be de minimis for constitutional purposes.
90. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
91. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
92. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
93. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
94. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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UNDERSTANDING PARRATT

Parratt'sstate action theory is a deeply problematic aspect of the
Court's complex three-fold classification. My submission is that Parratt
is not tenable, and it should be either overruled or recast.
A. Of Intentional Injuries
The line between "random and unauthorized" official conduct and
"authorized" conduct is unstable, as the recent decision in Regents of the
University of Michigan v. Ewing95 illustrates. There, the Court rejected
on the merits a substantive due process challenge to the dismissal of a
student from a special medical degree program. The student alleged
that his dismissal was contrary to both the announced policies and the
actual practices of the university for students experiencing academic
difficulty in this program. The complaint alleged state law contract and
estoppel theories, and a section 1983 claim.9 6 The Court did not consider Parratt,but the case can be understood in those terms: the heart
of the student's complaint was that he was dismissed as a result of the
"unauthorized" conduct of state officials. Perhaps, however, the dismissal was not "random" because it was made at a high enough administrative level. 9 7 If that be the explanation, "random" is a term of art,
and Parrattcollapses into little more than a distinction between acts of
"lower echelon state employees . . .and high ranking officials." 98 If,
however, Ewing holds that a plaintiff can always make a substantive due
process challenge for arbitrariness, Parralt and Hudson v. Palmer are
overruled completely.
But difficulties in understanding what constitutes "random and unauthorized" conduct are not the heart of my concern. Parratt'sasymmetric treatment of different kinds of official conduct cannot be
adequately rationalized in state action terms. No distinction can turn
on the adequacy of state corrective process, because that factor can be
held constant in all situations. 9 9 Parrattprovides no basis for a distinction between injuries to fundamental rights and injuries to other constitutional interests. As commentators have noted, Monroe and Parratt
95. 106 S. Ct. 507 (1985).
96. Id. at 509. Attempts to formulate the alleged official misconduct in equal protection terms is foreclosed by Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7-13 (1944).
97. 106 S. Ct. at 509.

98. Dwyer v. Regan, 777 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1985). Contra Holloway v. Walker,
790 F.2d 1170, 1173 (5th Cir. 1986); Economic Dev. Corp. v. Stierheim, 782 F.2d 952

(11 th Cir. 1986). The distinction between low and high level officials also has relevance
in determining municipal liability under § 1983. See Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati,
106 S. Ct. 1292, 1300 (1986).

99. Indeed, from one perspective the adequacy argument cuts against the lines
drawn by the Court. The Supreme Court can police the state courts through appellate
review of challenges to rules and practices but not of fact-dependent challenges to official misconduct. See H. Wechsler, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties and Civil
Rights 18-19 (1969).
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have the same structure: state officials have interfered with a constitutionally protected interest under circumstances in which their conduct
is illegal under state law and for which state law provides adequate corrective process.' 0 0
More fundamentally, as a means for determining the time when a
constitutional violation occurs, Parratt'sstate action theory is in direct
conflict with principles thought to be settled by Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles.' 0 ' There, the company filed a bill to enjoin the enforcement of a city rate ordinance, alleging that the rates
were confiscatory and thus the ordinance contravened the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The district court dismissed the
bill, reasoning that, if confiscatory, the rates were also illegal under the
state constitution, and since the state law provided corrective process,
the "state" could not be said to have deprived the company of property
without due process of law.' 0 2 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, rejecting the view that the fourteenth amendment applied to
the state only in its collective capacity and reached only wrongs "authorized" by the state.' 0 3 "[I]n truth," the amendment "contemplates
the possibility of state officers abusing the powers lawfully conferred
04
upon them by doing wrongs prohibited by the Amendment."'
Stressing the amendment's "completeness" and "comprehensive inclusiveness," the Court continued:
[W]here a state officer, under an assertion of power from the
State, is doing an act which could only be done upon the predicate that there was such power, the inquiry as to the repugnancy of the act to the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be
avoided by insisting that there is a want of power ....[W]hen
it is alleged that a state officer in virtue of state power is doing
an act which if permitted to be done prima facie would violate
the Amendment, the subject must be tested by assuming that the officer
possessed power if the act be one which there would not be opportunity" 0to5 perform but for the possession of some state
authority.'
100. See, e.g., Bator, Some Thoughts on Applied Federalism, 6 Harv.J. L. & Pub.
Pol'y 51, 56-58 (1982). Of course, in the exercise of its power to specify thejurisdiction
of the federal courts, Congress might distinguish between the two contexts. It could
conclude that only "fundamental" rights need or deserve the special protection of a
federal trial forum. Perhaps the Court could do the same under the rubric of abstention
doctrine, but it has not done so.
101. 227 U.S. 278 (1913). Home Telephone is generally understood to have confirmed the constitutional principles announced in Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
346-48 (1880). But see Zagrans, supra note 24, at 536-38 (Home Telephone interpreted
only the reach of the fourteenth amendment, not the meaning of § 1983's phrase
"under color of [state] law.")
102. See Home Telephone, 227 U.S. at 283.
103. See id. at 284.
104. Id. at 288.
105. Id. at 288-89 (emphasis added).
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Under Home Telephone, the fourteenth amendment reaches any executive or administrative conduct that contravenes the fourteenth
amendment. It makes no difference whether the state provides corrective process.' 0 6 More importantly, it makes no difference whether the
state official is using or misusing state power.10 7 Under Home Telephone,
the constitutionally offensive state action occurs at the point at which
the state official acts. This has been the standard understanding in constitutional law for many decades.10 8 Yet, under Parratt, some forms of
intentional conduct that "prima facie" would violate the amendment,
standing alone, cannot constitute constitutional violations.
Parrattmakes no effort to reconcile its conclusion with Home Telephone or Monroe v. Pape. Without reflection, the Court simply assumes
that the situations are different. There are plausible differences between fundamental rights and other rights, between challenges to state
and local policies and challenges to unadorned official misconduct, and
between situations in which the state provides adequate corrective process and those in which it does not. These factors have relevance in
legislative and judicial determinations as to the appropriate point at
which federal trial court intervention should occur. But they are not
relevant in determining the point at which a substantive violation has
occurred. Parratt'sstate action theory is fundamentally wrong, at least
so long as Home Telephone and Monroe v. Pape are thought to be sound.
B. Of Adequate Corrective Process
Additional difficulties emerge once we focus on Parratt'sapparent
premise that access to the federal courts is available if the state does not
provide some "adequate" corrective process for an intentional interference with a constitutionally protected "liberty" or "property" interest.
Does this mean that the state cannot abolish or sharply modify its common law of torts so as to create a special immunity from damages for
state officials? If the general fourteenth amendment standard of reasonableness is the test, a plausible argument can be advanced for at
least some such immunities.' 0 9 Both Daniels and Davidson presented
this issue, but the Court's disposition of both cases left it unresolved.
Perhaps eventually the Court will hold that Parrattdoes not require actual relief"I 0 But then what would Parrattmean?' '
106. See id. at 282-83.
107. See Id. at 287.
108. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944).
109. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), recognizes that much, sustaining
against fourteenth amendment attack a challenge to an immunity defense for public officials in the context of a state-created wrongful death action. The Court rejected a "sep.
arate" § 1983 claim because of insufficient causation. Id. at 285.
110. See, e.g., Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 1457-59 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1193 (1986). This conclusion draws support from the
fact that, for some unexplained reason, the Court has posed the adequacy question in
terms of a comparison with § 1983, asking whether the state law gave "about" as much
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C. Congress and Parratt
Parratt'spotential is quite startling once Congress is brought into
112
the picture. Consider an example suggested by Hudson v. Palmer,
which extended Panratt to bar a section 1983 challenge to the intentional misconduct of state officials who destroyed an inmate's property.
As in Parratt,the Court seems to have assumed that no substantive violation had been made out so long as the state court provided adequate
corrective process. Suppose that, after Hudson, the United States indicted the offending officials under a criminal statute that proscribed
the "intentional deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the
United States." Seemingly, Parratt'slogic requires dismissal: the random and unauthorized official misconduct does not constitute a violation given the existence of adequate state corrective process. This
result runs strongly against our intuitions.
Could Congress overrule Parratt?113 With a single arguable exception, 1 4 no Supreme Court decision has departed from the understanding of the Civil Rights Cases 1 15 that section five of the fourteenth
amendment authorizes "remedial" legislation only-that is, legislation
designed to correct state wrongdoing." 16 To be sure, in the race area
the remedial conception has been given such an expansive gloss that
any distinction between remedial and primary legislation has been
drained of substance. 117 But this development has evoked strong disrelief as § 1983. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Yet § 1983 itself recognizes a
substantial measure of official immunity in damage actions, see supra note 51, and it is
unlikely that the Court could insist that the state provide more generous relief than what
is now required by § 1983 for the rights that fall within its ambit. See generally Note,
Parrallv. Taylor Revisited: Defining the Adequate Remedy Requirement, 65 B.U.L. Rev.
607 (1985) (collecting cases and arguing that the state must provide a remedy).
111. If, however, the Court insists on a meaningful requirement of adequate state
corrective process, the Court must not only superintend state tort law, it must distinguish further between state-caused injuries to "liberty" or "property" and other kinds of
state injuries to specific individuals. Specifically, it must determine whether the "no liberty," "no property" approach of Roth and Paulv. Davis to the due process clause should
extend to matters of substantive due process, with the result that an important range of
state conduct would escape the need to satisfy a substantive "rationality" requirement.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text. This problem, however, may have more theoretical than practical consequences. A substantive rationality demand can be required
by recasting the claim as an equal protection challenge, a challenge that does not require
the existence of any antecedent liberty or property interest. See, e.g., Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1982) (Blackmun, J., separate opinion);
id. at 443-44 (Powell, J., concurring).
112. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
113. Herbert Wechsler called this problem to my attention.
114. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (alternative holding).
115. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
116. See G. Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 968-71 (11 th ed.

1985).
117. See Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980).
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sents" 18 and is not likely to be pressed beyond the race area. If that is
true, it is doubtful that Congress could overrule Parratt: there would
be nothing to "remedy" since the official misconduct is not itself a violation where the state legislative scheme has adequate corrective process. Of course, one can readily imagine the countermoves. Congress
could "find" that, though fair on its face, the state remedial scheme will
not work in practice and that a federal cause of action is therefore necessary to vindicate fourteenth amendment rights.1 19 Whether this
"prophylactic" argument would prevail outside the race area, or
whether congressional power under article I, section 8 might support
federal legislation, is not important for my purposes. The difficulties
cast doubt on Parrattsimply because the decision makes so complex our
understanding of the fourteenth amendment. In constitutional law, as
elsewhere, needless complexity should be eschewed.
V. OVERRULING OR RECASTING PARRA2T

The appropriate role of the federal courts in cases of misuse of
authority by state officials is a problem with a very long history. Leaving aside differing conceptions of what amounts to "authorization," the
view that only "authorized" state conduct can offend the fourteenth
amendment has been espoused before. 120 As a theory of "state action"
it was categorically rejected in Home Telephone. 12 1 However, in Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Monroe v. Pape,12 2 it resurfaced, this
time as a theory of statutory construction. Justice Frankfurter insisted
that an unreasonable search and seizure by police officers did not occur
"under color of [state] law]" for purposes of section 1983 where the
conduct violated state law unless it was in fact supported by some cus12 3
tom or usage.
Parrattresurrects this tradition. Parrattasserts that some forms of
official misconduct do not fall within the ambit of the fourteenth
amendment so long as the state provides corrective process. Parratt's
push to embrace some such position is understandable-indeed, in
118. E.g., id. at 206 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

119. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 229, 235-36 (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
120. It appears in several opinions of Justice Field in the late nineteenth century.
See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 333 (1879) (separate opinion of Field, J.); Ex Parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 349-70 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting). It is arguably the Court's
holding in Barney v. New York, 193 U.S. 430, 437 (1904), and reappears in Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
121. 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913).
122. 365 U.S. 167, 202 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
123. See id. at 245-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part). The position is
equivalent to the Court's position in Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879), because
Justice Frankfurter recognized that Congress had power to reach unauthorized state
conduct. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 211-12.
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practical terms, imperative-if negligence could amount to a "deprivation." But, after Daniels, the practical need for this remaining aspect of
Parrattis far less clear, particularly given the difficulty of its application.
But my real concern is at the level of theory. The lines drawn by
Parratt,however defensible they may be when viewed as a sensible use
of the federal trial courts, render the decision incoherent as a theory of
state action. That result is quite unnecessary, even accepting the
Court's policy objectives. The Court could find a far less controversial
basis for its results in abstention doctrine. This would be my preference. But, alternatively, the Court might, as Justice Rehnquist has suggested, re-examine Monroe's holding that section 1983's reach is
coextensive with the reach of the fourteenth amendment. 124 Of course,

the two can be read as perfectly congruent, but such a reading is not
necessary.' 2 5 Parrattcould be rationalized as a construction of section
1983 under which wholly unauthorized official misconduct with respect
to interests whose origins are in state law and where adequate state
corrective process exists does not occur "under color of [state law]"
within the meaning of section 1983.126 Whether this reading comports
comfortably with the language or the original intention of section 1983
is another matter. 12 7 For me, the decisive point is that if Parrattis not
overruled, it is far better to charge its narrowing results to abstention
28
principles or to section 1983 than to the fourteenth amendment.'
124. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905, 910-11 (Rehnquist,J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that where state proceedings have already been initiated by
plaintiff, § 1983, unlike the fourteenth amendment, may require exhaustion of state
remedies before plaintiff may have recourse to a federal court).
125. Statutes tracking constitutional language need not be read to embrace all that
the Constitution embraces. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct.
3231, 3232 (1986).

126. This move will not work if the plaintiff can turn around and assert a Bivens
claim under the fourteenth amendment. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). Regardless of whether Bivens applies to fourteenth amendment claims,
it seems inapplicable where an alternative adequate remedial scheme is in place. See

Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
Perhaps one could go further and limit Parrattto property claims. But § 1983 does
not readily admit the distinction, and it is a hard one to maintain in principle. See Lynch
v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
127. See Zagrans, supra note 24, at 525-60. Professor Zagrans believes that, while

the existence of state corrective process is irrelevant, § 1983 "was meant to create liability only for acts done with state authority." Id. at 559.
128. I recognize that adherence to stare decisis in matters of statutory interpretation is important. See Square D. Co. v. Niagra Frontier Tariff Bureau, 106 S. Ct. 1922,
1930 n.34 (1986). But here, abandoning stare decisis seems to me a lesser evil than

unnecessary distortions of the Constitution. See Monnell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 (1978) (court will not apply stare decisis "mechanically"

to uphold prior statutory holding).

